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INTRODUCTION

The purchase of a home is at the heart of the American dream. This step in
the life of the average American entails much uncertainty, as prospective
homeowners rely on the expertise of many different facilitators when they set out
to make their largest investment. For some homeowners, the dream turns into a
nightmare because the home is fraught with construction defects, termite
damage, or a crumbling foundation.I The nightmare is even worse if a home
inspection report claimed the home had no defects.
Unfortunately for the homeowner, upon seeking out the inspector for an
explanation, all the inspector may offer is a denial of any wrongdoing; the return
of the fee paid; and a reminder that, under the home inspection contract, the
inspector is liable only for the return of his fee.2 The new homeowner would
then face thousands of dollars in unexpected repairs to the home, while the home
inspector walks away as if the contract never existed. The home inspector can
escape accountability for failing to report the issues to the buyer. Additionally,
while the inspector will be restored to his original position before entering into
the agreement, the homebuyer will face thousands of dollars in home repairs. Is
the law fair when it allows this result, letting service providers-such as home
inspectors perform poor work and then escape from liability for their
negligence?

1. This hypothetical scenario is based on Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 739 S.E.2d 882
(2013).
2.
See, e.g., id. at 142 n.1, 739 S.E.2d at 883 n.1 (reviewing a limited liability clause that
only allowed for the return of a home inspection fee in case of breach).
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Under current South Carolina law, a limitation of liability provision-like in
the home inspection contract described above-is enforceable, unless the
provision is unconscionable or conflicts with public policy. 3 The courts'
determination of unconscionability depends on several factors, including but
not limited to the bargaining positions of the parties, the subject matter of the
contract, and the visibility of the limitation of liability clause. To determine if
the clause violates public policy, courts will look to whether the contract
concerns a public interest.5 If the clause concerns a public interest and conflicts
with the public policy related to that interest, courts will hold that the clause is
unenforceable. 6
In South Carolina, the current method for determining the enforceability of
limitation of liability provisions in contracts fails to provide reliable guidance for
drafting or interpreting these common provisions. The multitude of factors
involved, as well as the fact-intensive analysis needed to determine conflicts
with public policy and unconscionability, result in inconsistent decisions and an
unreasonably high barrier for parties attempting to challenge such clauses. To
provide reliable guidance, the law in South Carolina needs a consistent test for
determining the enforceability of a limitation of liability provision in consumer
contracts for services. Specifically, courts should adopt the balancing test used
for determining the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses for limitation of
liability provisions.
Adopting this test to analyze limitation of liability
provisions would provide efficient determination of enforceability, while
adhering to public policy interests and voiding unconscionable clauses in
contracts.
This Note discusses the use of limitation of liability clauses in South
Carolina and proposes changes to the courts' analysis of these clauses. Part I
discusses the state of the law in South Carolina regarding damage limiting
clauses in contracts and the general effect of damage limiting clauses. Part II
explains limitation of liability clauses and the tests used to determine their
enforceability. Part III discusses liquidated damages clauses and the balancing
test used to determine whether they are enforceable. Part IV proposes a new test
to determine the enforceability of limitation of liability clauses that will not only
ease the burdens placed on consumers by these clauses, but also provide for a
more efficient determination of enforceability.

3.
See, e.g., id. at 146, 739 S.E.2d at 885 (concluding that a limitation of liability provision
in a home inspection contract was enforceable, as it was neither unconscionable nor did it violate
public policy).
4.
See id. at 145-46, 739 S.E.2d at 885.
5.
See id. at 155, 739 S.E.2d at 890 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (quoting Pride v. S. Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 244 S.C. 615, 620, 138 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1964)).
6.
See id. at 159, 739 S.E.2d at 892.
7.
See, e.g., id. at 150, 739 S.E.2d at 887 ("'[T]here is no hard and fast definition of
unconscionability' and ... it is 'an amorphous concept."' (quoting Lucier v. Williams, 841 A.2d
907, 911 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004))).
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CONTRACT PROVISIONS ALTERING TRADITIONAL CONTRACT LIABILITY

A.

The Clauses Explained

One type of liability altering clause is a limitation of liability clause, which
caps the amount of one party's or both parties' liability under the contract.8
Limitation of liability clauses in contracts are so common today that most
consumers regularly enter into agreements in which the consumer's remedy is
severely limited.9 In most instances, the limitation of liability clause goes
unnoticed by the consumer and exists only to allow the service provider to cap
its potential losses from the multiple contracts to which the service provider is a
party. 10 The consumer and the service provider rarely negotiate the limitation of
liability clause; instead, the service provider typically drafts the agreement and
presents it to the consumer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." Furthermore, in the
event of a breach of the contract between the consumer and the service provider,
the limitation of liability clause becomes the consumer's nightmare and the
service provider's sigh of relief.
The limitation of liability clause does not foreclose a party's cause of action
under the contract, nor does it eliminate either party's liability; rather, the clause
"guarantees only that a party will not be held liable for damages above a
specified ceiling."l2 These clauses allow contracting parties to negotiate the
amount of liability under the contract and anticipate the potential losses in the
event of a breach.13 This method of negotiated liability allows for more efficient
business transactions because the clause prepares the parties for any potential
losses and the parties know the specific amount of potential liability. 14
Efficiency results when both parties understand the limitation of liability clause
and the potential impact of the clause. The impact of the clause is especially

8.
Allen Holt Gwyn, Legislative and Judicial Responses to Limitation of Liability
Provisions, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Oct. 1996, at 61, 61 (citing Reeder R. Fox & Lisa Wolff,
Enforcing Limitation of Liability Provisions in Owner/Architect/Engineer Contracts, 62 DEF.
COuNS. J. 407, 408 (1995)).
9.
See, e.g., Gladden, 402 S.C. at 144, 739 S.E.2d at 884 ("Limitation of liability ... clauses
are routinely entered into.").
10. See, e.g., id. at 149, 739 S.E.2d at 886 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
consumer was likely not advised of the presence of the limitation of liability clause); see also
Gwyn, supra note 8, at 61 (citing Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., 44 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 1995);
Fox & Wolff, supra note 8, at 408; JuSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE,
ENGINEERING, AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 731-33 (4th ed. 1984)).

11. See Gladden, 402 S.C. at 147, 739 S.E.2d at 885-86 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (quoting
Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 26 27, 644 S.E.2d 663, 669 (2007))
(determining that the home inspection contract was a contract of adhesion and defining a contract of
adhesion).
12. Gwyn, supra note 8, at 61 (citing Fox & Wolff, supra note 8, at 408).
13. See id. (citing STEVEN G.M. STEIN, CONSTRUCTION LAW 11-69 (1986)).
14. See id.
15. See id.
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relevant to consumer contracts for services where the consumer is likely an
unsophisticated party and, thus, unaware of the provision limiting the potential
recovery in the event of the service provider's breach. 16
Limitation of liability clauses are, however, distinguishable from indemnity
provisions and exculpatory clauses in contracts. While all of the clauses serve
a damage limiting function, each clause operates differently.18 Indemnity
provisions, rather than reducing or eliminating a party's liability, shift the
liability from the indemnitee to the indemnitor. 19 In other words, one party is
contractually obligated to defend or pay for harm caused by another party.
Conversely, exculpatory clauses completely eliminate one party's liability to
the other in a contractual agreement.20 Courts have upheld exculpatory clauses
in South Carolina, but "[s]ince such provisions tend to induce a want of care,
they are not favored by the law and will be strictly construed against the party
relying thereon." 21
Although limitation of liability and exculpatory clauses are technically
distinct, courts in South Carolina seem to use the terms interchangeably.22 Thus,
South Carolina courts apply the same reasoning and precedent to both limitation
of liability clause and exculpatory clause cases.23
B. South Carolina'sInterpretationofLimitation ofLiability Clauses
South Carolina courts generally uphold limitation of liability clauses in
contracts to protect the private parties' right of freedom of contract.24 However,
limitation of liability clauses are subject to challenge on two main theories:
unconscionability and conflict with public policy.25 These two challenges hardly
create black letter rules, leading to many disputes being decided on a fact-

16. See, e.g., Gladden, 402 S.C. at 149, 739 S.E.2d at 886 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (describing
that the consumer was likely not advised of the presence of the limitation of liability clause).
17. Gwyn, supranote 8, at 61.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Pride v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 244 S.C. 615, 619, 138 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1964).
22. See, e.g., Fisher v. Stevens, 355 S.C. 290, 294-95, 297, 584 S.E.2d 149, 152, 153 (Ct.
App. 2003) (citing Huckaby v. Confederate Motor Speedway, Inc., 276 S.C. 629, 281 S.E.2d 223
(1981); Pride, 244 S.C. 615, 138 S.E.2d 155) (analyzing what the court calls an "exculpatory
clause" but which does not release the parties from all liability).
23. See, e.g., id. at 294-95, 584 S.E.2d at 152 (citing Huckaby, 276 S.C. 629, 281 S.E.2d
223; Pride, 244 S.C. 615, 138 S.E.2d 155) (relying on limitation of liability precedent to discuss an
exculpatory agreement).
24. See id. (citing Huckaby, 276 S.C. 629, 281 S.E.2d 223; Pride, 244 S.C. 615, 138 S.E.2d
155); Pride,244 S.C. at 619, 138 S.E.2d at 157.
25. See, e.g., Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 141, 739 S.E.2d 882, 882-83 (2013)
(reviewing a limitation of liability clause due to challenges of unconscionability and conflict with
public policy).
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intensive, case-by-case basis.26 Unfortunately, this approach leaves practically
no guidance to legal practitioners on how to draft effective and enforceable
limitation of liability clauses. Furthermore, challenges based on conflicts with
public policy and unconscionability create large hurdles for consumers that
typically leave consumers without an adequate remedy.2
In contractual agreements between consumers and service providers, the
parties to the contract must have realistic motives to act diligently in carrying out
their respective duties. Excessively limited damages reduce the parties' motives
to carry out their duties in this manner.28 Parties typically face the following
motivations: payment for completing the contract, the benefit of the completed
bargain, and the potential liability for breaching the contract.29 Frequently, the
party drafting the agreement usually the service provider will include a
limitation of liability clause that caps its potential damages if the provider
breaches the contract.
This standard practice reduces the transaction costs of
the contract by providing a method for the parties to anticipate the potential
losses in the event of breach.31 These clauses, however, are usually so broad that
they essentially eliminate liability on behalf of the party seeking enforcement of
the clause and provide only nominal recovery to the consumer.32
To remedy this problem, courts should utilize the balancing test for
liquidated damages clauses outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
which South Carolina courts have adopted-to determine the enforceability of
limitation of liability provisions. 33 The Restatement's test determines the
enforceability of liquidated damages clauses by balancing the reasonableness of
the estimate of damages at the time of contract formation with the actual
34
damages a party suffered. In applying this test, a court would need to focus on
whether, at the time of contracting, the limitation of liability clause was a

26. See, e.g., id. at 148, 739 S.E.2d at 886 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the
"importance of a case-by-case analysis" of limitation of liability clause litigation (quoting Simpson
v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 36, 644 S.E.2d 663, 674 (2007))).
27. See, e.g., id. at 146, 739 S.E.2d at 885 (majority opinion) (holding, after minimal
discussion, that a limitation of liability provision in a home inspection contract was neither
unconscionable nor did it violate public policy).
28. See id. at 150, 739 S.E.2d at 887 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (quoting Lucier v. Williams, 841
A.2d 907, 912 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)).
29. See generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance
Motivations: Comment on Feldman, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 53 (2011) (discussing the intrinsic
and extrinsic motivations that may exist to compel parties to comply with the law).
30. See Gwyn, supra note 8, at 61 (citing STEIN, supranote 13).
3 1. See id.
32. See, e.g., Murray v. Tex. Co., 172 S.C. 399, 402-03, 174 S.E. 231, 232 (1934) (reviewing
a limitation of liability clause that was overly "broad and comprehensive").
33. See Erie Ins. Co. v. Winter Constr. Co., 393 S.C. 455, 460, 713 S.E.2d 318, 321 (Ct. App.
2011) (citing Lewis v. Premium Inv. Corp., 351 S.C. 167, 172, 568 S.E.2d 361, 363 (2002)).
34.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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genuine, reasonable allocation of prospective loss in the event of breach. Next,
the court would compare the estimate of loss provided in the limitation of
liability clause to the actual loss the consumer suffered.36 The comparison of the
estimate of loss to the actual loss suffered is balanced against the relative
difficulty in determining the prospective loss at the time of contracting.37 If the
prospective loss was impossible to determine at the time of contracting, the court
should defer to the intent of the parties.38 If, however, the prospective loss was
relatively easy to determine at the time of contracting, then the court should
compare the clause precisely with the actual harm suffered.39 In other words, the
more difficult it is to estimate the loss, the more likely it is that a court will find
the limitation clause enforceable.
III. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY CLAUSES
A.

Limitation ofLiability Clauses in South Carolina

Currently, under South Carolina law, courts invalidate limitation of liability
clauses in consumer service provider contracts when the clause is either
unconscionable or violates public policy. 40
With regard to the enforceability of limitation of liability clauses, South
Carolina law defines unconscionability as "the absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, together with terms
that are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no fair
and honest person would accept them." 41
In determining whether a contract term is unconscionable, courts will
consider a variety of five major factors: (1) the bargaining positions of the
42
43
parties; (2) the visibility of the clause; (3) when the contract was presented to

35. Cf id. ("Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the
difficulties of proof of loss.").
36. Cf id. § 356 cmt. b ("The amount fixed is reasonable to the extent that it approximates
the actual loss that has resulted from the particular breach, even though it may not approximate the
loss that might have been anticipated under other possible breaches.").
37. Cf. id. (suggesting that the anticipated or actual loss be weighed against the
reasonableness of the amount of money fixed as damages in a liquidated damages clause).
38. Cf id. ("[T]he estimate of the court or jury may not accord with the principle of
compensation any more than does the advance estimate of the parties.").
39. Cf id. ("If, on the other hand, the difficulty of the proof of loss is slight, less latitude is
allowed in that approximation.").
40. See, e.g., Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 141, 739 S.E.2d 882, 882-83 (2013)
(reviewing challenges of unconscionability and conflict with public policy for a limitation of
liability clause).
41. Id. at 144, 739 S.E.2d at 884 (quoting Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C.
14, 24 25, 644 S.E.2d 663, 668 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. See, e.g., Georgetown Steel Corp. v. Law Eng'g Testing Co., 7 F.3d 223, 1993 WL
358770, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 14, 1993) (unpublished table decision) (reviewing the bargaining
position of sophisticated companies).
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the other party;44 (4) the clarity of the limiting language; and, in some cases,
(5) whether a mandatory arbitration rovision combined with a limitation of
liability clause is unduly burdensome. 6 The burden for meeting the factors of
unconscionability is high, and no single factor is determinative as to whether the
provision is unconscionable.47
The first factor focuses on the relative bargaining position of the parties,
primarily looking to the sophistication of each party.
Courts will look at the
nature of the agreement and the education of the consumer to determine
sophistication, along with analyzing other factors. 49 When sophisticated parties
agree to a contract with a limitation of liability clause in an arm's length
negotiation, a South Carolina court will almost never invalidate the limitation
clause and, instead, will opt to preserve the parties' freedom of contract.o The
courts usually reason that each of the parties possesses superior knowledge about
the terms of the contract and, thus, the parties knew what they were getting
themselves into.5 1 When businesses enter into agreements with one another, it is
relatively easy to determine that the parties to the agreement were sophisticated
52
and knew the implications of the limitation of liability clause.
When the
contract is between a consumer and a service provider, however, the meaning of
sophisticatedparty is more difficult to ascertain.53 In Gladden v. Boykin,54 a

43. See, e.g., Gladden, 402 S.C. at 146, 739 S.E.2d at 885 (evaluating the visibility of the
limitation of liability clause in a home inspection contract).
44. See, e.g., id. at 149, 739 S.E.2d at 886 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (reviewing the time at
which the service providers presented the contract).
45. See, e.g., Murray v. Tex. Co., 172 S.C. 399, 402-03, 174 S.E. 231, 232 (1934)
(commenting on the clearness of language in a limited liability provision).
46. See, e.g., Gladden, 402 S.C. at 152-53, 739 S.E.2d at 888 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (citing
Pitts v. Watkins, 905 So. 2d 553, 557-58 (Miss. 2005)) (commenting on an arbitration provision
combined with a limited liability clause).
47. See id. at 145, 739 S.E.2d at 884-85 (majority opinion); id. at 150, 739 S.E.2d at 887
(Beatty, J., dissenting) (quoting Lucier v. Williams, 841 A.2d 907, 911 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004)).
48. See, e.g., id. at 145-46, 739 S.E.2d at 885 (reviewing the bargaining positions of the
parties by analyzing their sophistication).
49. See, e.g., id. (discussing the consumer's education level as a factor in determining
whether the contract was unconscionable).
50. See, e.g., id. at 145, 146, 739 S.E.2d at 884-85 (noting that "[c]ourts should not refuse to
enforce a contract on grounds of unconscionability" and upholding the limitation of liability
contract).
51. See, e.g., id. at 145-46, 739 S.E.2d at 885 (indicating that both parties possessed adequate
sophistication).
52. See, e.g., Georgetown Steel Corp. v. Law Eng'g Testing Co., 7 F.3d 223, 1993 WL
358770, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 14, 1993) (unpublished table decision) (holding that a limitation of
liability clause is enforceable when parties are sophisticated business entities participating in an
arm's length negotiation).
53. Compare Gladden, 402 S.C. at 145-46, 739 S.E.2d at 885 (concluding that a consumer
was a sophisticated party), with id. at 148-49, 739 S.E.2d at 886 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (concluding
that the same consumer was not a sophisticated party).
54. 402 S.C. 140, 739 S.E.2d 882.
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majority of the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that the parties to a home
inspection contract were both sophisticated because the home inspector was a
business owner and had many years of experience performing home inspections,
and the home-buyer consumer was a trained real estate agent. 5 The majority
reasoned that the inspector and consumer were in relatively equal bargaining
positions and that the consumer possessed the so histication necessary to
understand the contract to protect her own interests.
The dissent, however,
pointed out that the consumer had actually worked as a real estate agent for only
a few months, several years prior, and never even had her own listings. The
dissent argued that the fact that the consumer had "limited work in this area
[was] not relevant under the circumstances" of the agreement.
The disparity
between the majority and minority view in Gladden-regarding the
sophistication of the consumer-demonstrates the difficulty in ascertaining
whether a party to a contract was sophisticated enough to truly understand the
terms of the agreement and their respective implications.
With respect to the second factor for determining unconscionability, the
South Carolina Supreme Court recently held that "the proper test is whether an
important clause was particularly inconspicuous, as if the drafter intended to
obscure the term.'59 However, the inconsistency in determining the proper
visibility of the clause demonstrates the difficulty in applying this factor of the
test for unconscionability on a case-by-case basis. For example, in Gladden, the
majority held that the limitation of liability provision in the contract was
sufficiently visible because the contract was one page long and all of the
provisions were in the same size font and equally visible.60 The dissent,
however, argued that because the limitation of liability clause did not stand out
in the contract more than the other clauses its inconspicuousness was evidence of
the clause's unconscionability. 61
The third factor, involving the timing of contract presentation, is more
straightforward to apply. The service provider must present the contract to the
consumer before the service is performed, and evidence that the provider did not
present the contract until after the service was performed is evidence of the
unconscionable nature of the limitation of liability clause.62 In Gladden, the
dissent found it relevant that the home inspector did not present the contract to
the plaintiff until after he performed the inspection.63 To the dissent, this
demonstrated the plaintiffs inability to adequately review and consent to the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
presented
63.

Id. at 145-46, 730 S.E.2d at 885 (majority opinion).
See id.
Id. at 148, 739 S.E.2d at 886 (Beatty, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 146, 739 S.E.2d at 885 (majority opinion).
Id.
See id. at 149, 739 S.E.2d at 886-87 (Beatty J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 149, 739 S.E.2d at 886 (reviewing the time at which the service provider
the home inspection contract).
See id.
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terms of the contract, which, coupled with the inconspicuousness of the
limitation of liability clause and other factors, was evidence of
unconscionability. 64
The fourth factor courts consider is the clarity of the limiting language,
which requires the court to construe ambiguities against the party seeking
enforcement of the clause. 65 In Murray v. Texas Co.,66 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the ambiguous language in a limitation of liability
clause invalidated the clause and, therefore, deprived the drafting party of the
benefit of the clause.67 In that case, an oil company sought to enforce a
limitation of liability provision in a contract with a gas station owner operator. 68
The court reasoned that because the oil company wrote the provision into the
contract, it could have easily worded the provision to limit the company's
69
liability in the dispute. However, because the oil company failed to do so, the
court construed the ambiguities in the provision against it and, therefore, did not
relieve the oil company from its own negligence in performing the agreement. 0
The fifth factor applies to cases in which a contract contains both a
limitation of liability clause and a mandatory arbitration clause. The presence
of both a mandatory arbitration clause and a limitation of liability clause in a
contract is evidence of unconscionability, as the arbitration process may involve
fees far in excess of any possible recovery under the limitation of liability
72
clause. The consumer is "effectively denied any recovery" because the fees are
larger than the possible recovery, and "this [is] further evidence of
unconscionability." 3
Gladden v. Boykin is the South Carolina Supreme Court's most recent
decision concerning an unconscionable limitation of liability clause. The case
resulted in a divided court, with Justice Beatty delivering a lengthy dissenting
opinion. The majority opinion raised the barrier for proving unconscionability
even higher than past precedent, reasoning that "even when the substance of the
terms appear grossly unreasonable," courts should hold the limitation of liability
clause unconscionable only in narrow circumstances.
Specifically, the clause
is unconscionable-and the courts must refuse to enforce it-only when an
"extreme inequality of bargaining power" exists, together with factors such as

64. See id. at 149, 153, 739 S.E.2d at 886-87, 889.
65. See Murray v. Tex. Co., 172 S.C. 399, 402-03, 174 S.E. 231, 232 (1934).
66. 172 S.C. 399, 174 S.E. 231.
67. Id. at 402-03, 174 S.E. at 232.
68. See id. at 400, 401, 174 S.E. at 231-32.
69. Id. at 402, 174 S.E. at 232.
70. Id. at 402-03, 174 S.E. at 232.
71. See Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 152-53, 739 S.E.2d 882, 888 (2013) (Beatty, J.,
dissenting) (citing Pitts v. Watkins, 905 So. 2d 553, 557-58 (Miss. 2005)).
72. See id. (citing Pitts, 905 So. 2d at 557-58).
73. Id. (citing Pitts, 905 So. 2d at 557-58).
74. See id. at 146-47, 739 S.E.2d at 885.
75. Id. at 145, 739 S.E.2d at 884-85.
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evidence that the drafter intended to obscure the term or that the term was
unreadable.76 These factors must combine to demonstrate "that the party against
whom enforcement is sought cannot be said to have consented to the contract."
Unlike the majority's narrow consideration of the inequality of bargaining
power, 7 the dissent made a broader inquiry into other indicators of
unconscionability.79
The dissent argued that the determination of
unconscionability should focus on the "fundamental fairness of the bargaining
process" and the "[a]bsence of meaningful choice on the part of one party."80
The absence of meaningful choice in assenting to the provision, under the
dissent's view, is determined by the type of injury suffered, any disproportionate
bargaining power between the parties, the parties' relative sophistication, the
visibility of the term, and whether there is an "element of surprise in the
inclusion of the challenged term." 8 The dissent highlighted the "importance of
a case-by-case analysis" in determining unconscionability so that the courts can
address the unique circumstances of each contract.82
Additionally, in determining enforceability, courts consider whether a
limitation of liability clause violates public policy, looking first to whether the
contract concerns a public interest. 83 Courts consider a wide variety of factors to
make this determination. 84 These factors include, but are not limited to, whether
(1) the contracting party is a public service provider, 5 (2) regulations require the
contract to be filed with a state agency,86 (3) the service provider had a public
duty to provide the particular service, (4) the contract is one for professional

76. Id.
77. Id. at 145, 739 S.E.2d at 885.
78. See id. at 146, 739 S.E.2d at 885.
79. See id. at 147-53, 739 S.E.2d at 885-89 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 148, 739 S.E.2d at 886 (quoting Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C.
14, 25, 644 S.E.2d 663, 669 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. (quoting Simpson, 373 S.C. at 25, 644 S.E.2d at 669).
82. Id. (quoting Simpson, 373 S.C. at 36, 644 S.E.2d at 674).
83. See Pride v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 244 S.C. 615, 620, 138 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1964)
(citing Mayfield v. S. Ry. Co., 85 S.C. 165, 168-69, 67 S.E. 132, 133 (1910); Savannah Bldg.
Supply Co. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 85 S.C. 405, 413, 67 S.E. 1135 (1910); German-Am. Ins.
Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 77 S.C. 467, 471, 58 S.E. 337, 339 (1907)).
84. See, e.g., id. at 620-21, 138 S.E.2d at 157 (citing Mayfield v. S. Ry. Co., 85 S.C. 165,
168-69, 67 S.E. 132, 133 (1910); Savannah Bldg. Supply Co. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 85 S.C.
405, 413, 67 S.E. 1135 (1910); German-Am. Ins. Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 77 S.C. 467, 471, 58 S.E. 337,
339 (1907)) (discussing factors).
85. See, e.g., id. at 620, 138 S.E.2d at 157 ("It is necessary, therefore, to first determine
whether the publication ... was in any way connected with defendant's public service as a
telephone company.").
86. See, e.g., id. (noting that the contract was not required to be filed with the South Carolina
Public Service Commission).
87. See, e.g., S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 283 S.C. 182, 192, 322 S.E.2d
453, 459 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the relationship between the parties arose by private contract
in its decision to uphold the validity of an exculpatory clause).
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services, (5) a statute expressly allows the limitation, 89 (6) the state has
imposed statutes or regulations to protect the public interest concerned in the
contract, 90 and (7) the "public interest requires the performance of a private
duty." 91
If a court determines that the contract involves a public interest, the court
will then look to the public policy surrounding the service the contract
concerns.92 First, the court will look to legislative enactments to determine
public policy regarding the specified service. 93 Only if the legislation is silent
regarding the nature of the contract will the court look to the "judicially crafted
public policy." 94 The court must then make a case-by-case determination of
whether the contract violates the announced public policy. 95
Alternatively, rather than violating a specific, announced policy, a limitation
of liability clause may violate public policy for being overly broad.96 In Fisher
v. Stevens,97 the South Carolina Court of Appeals recognized that when a
limitation of liability clause is "so broad 'that it would absolve [the enforcing
party] from any injury to the [other party] for any reason,"' the clause is "too
broad to be enforceable . . . and void as against public policy." 98

Although

determining whether the provision in that case eliminated liability for any reason

88. See, e.g., Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 155, 739 S.E.2d 882, 890 (2013) (Beatty, J.,
dissenting) ("The cases cited ... do not concern professional service contracts, where different
policy considerations exist because public policy is averse to allowing professional negligence to be
insulated from liability by a contractual provision.").
89. See, e.g., id. (noting that South Carolina law allows home inspection companies to limit
the scope of the inspection through contract).
90. See, e.g., id. at 159, 739 S.E.2d at 891 ("Under South Carolina law, the state may impose
statutory or regulatory requirements for the purpose of protecting the public interest." (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. § 40- 1-10(B) (2011)).
91. Pride, 244 S.C. at 619 20, 138 S.E.2d 155, 157 (citing Murray v. Tex. Co., 172 S.C. 399,
402, 174 S.E. 231, 232 (1934); Savannah Bldg. Supply Co. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 85 S.C.
405, 413, 67 S.E. 1135 (1910)).
92. See, e.g., Gladden, 402 S.C. at 143-44, 739 S.E.2d at 883-84 (citing S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 27-50-65 (2007)) (discussing how to view inspection contracts in light of the public policy of
protecting home buyers from defects).
93. Id. at 143, 739 S.E.2d at 883.
94. See id. at 144, 739 S.E.2d at 884; see also id. at 154, 739 S.E.2d at 889 (Beatty, J.,
dissenting) ("Expressions of public policy may be found in constitutional or statutory authority or in
judicial decisions." (citing White v. J.M. Brown Amusement Co., 360 S.C. 366, 371, 601 S.E.2d
342, 345 (2004))).
95. See, e.g., id., 402 S.C. at 143-44, 739 S.E.2d at 883-84 (majority opinion) (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. § 27-50-65 (2007)) (determining public policy with respect to home inspection
contracts).
96. Fisher v. Stevens, 355 S.C. 290, 297, 584 S.E.2d 149, 153 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing
Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118 (Wis. 1994)).
97. 355 S.C. 290, 584 S.E.2d 149.
98. Id. at 297, 584 S.E.2d at 153 (quoting Richards, 513 N.W.2d at 121). Note that the court
in Fisherused the term "exculpatory agreement" to describe the limitation of liability clause. Id. It
is debatable whether this clause was a limitation of liability provision or actually an exculpatory
clause. See id. at 294, 584 S.E.2d at 151; see also supra Part I.A (discussing the differentiation
between limitation of liability and exculpatory clauses).
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was relatively simple because of the all-encompassing language of the clause
alone, 99 the rule is often difficult to apply. Many times, a limitation of liability
clause that does not alone absolve the enforcing party of liability will be coupled
with other contractual provisions and, when read together, essentially eliminate
the liability of one party to another.100 In such a scenario, the determination of
whether a provision is overly broad is difficult because of the interplay of the
contract provisions.
B. Limitation ofLiability Clauses in Other States
Throughout the United States, courts have taken various approaches in
determining the enforceability of limitation of liability clauses. 101 Some state
courts take the same common law-based approach as South Carolina, upholdin
these provisions unless they are unconscionable or violate public policy. 0
Other states have a statutory scheme to address limitation of liability provisions
in certain contexts.103 Additionally, some state courts use a hybrid approach and
apply the state's anti-indemnity statutes to analyze limitation of liability
clauses. 104 For example, an Alaska court has held that the statute prohibiting
indemnification provisions in construction contracts that indemnify against a
party's sole negligence applies both to indemnity clauses and limitation of
liability clauses in contracts. o0 The court reasoned that because the statute states
that such an indemnification clause is "void and unenforceable," the legislature
intended the statute to apply both when a party attempted to use the clause for
indemnification and when a party interpreted the clause to limit liability. 106
Therefore, the statute governed the limitation of liability provisions at issue in
that case because the party was not seeking indemnity and the statute applied to
"interpreting" the clause, as well as seeking the clause's enforcement.
The
clause violated the anti-indemnity statute as an indemnity clause, and the party

99. See Fisher,355 S.C. at 292-93, 584 S.E.2d at 150-51.
100. See, e.g., Gladden, 402 S.C. at 152-53, 739 S.E.2d at 888 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (citing
Pitts v. Watkins, 905 So. 2d 553, 557-58 (Miss. 2005)) (arguing that a limitation of liability clause
paired with a mandatory arbitration provision essentially left the consumer with no adequate
remedy).
101. See Gwyn, supranote 8, at 61.
102. See, e.g., Lucier v. Williams, 841 A.2d 907, 912 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
(holding a limitation of liability clause in a home inspection contract void as against public policy
and as unconscionable).
103. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-411 (2013) (allowing design professionals, such as
architects, to use limitation of liability provisions).
104. See, e.g., City of Dillingham v. CH2M Hill Nw., Inc., 873 P.2d 1271, 1277-78 (Alaska
1994) (holding that Alaska's anti-indemnity statute applies to limitation of liability clauses as well).
While South Carolina does have an anti-indemnity statute, South Carolina courts do not apply the
statute to limitation of liability provisions. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-2-10 (2007).
105. See City ofDillingham, 873 P.2d at 1278.
106. See id. (quoting ALASKA STAT.

§ 45.45.900

(2012)).

107. See id.
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seeking enforcement of the clause could not interpret the clause as a limitation of
liability clause to escape the restrictions the statute placed on the enforceability
of indemnity clauses. 10
While some states apply the same approach as South Carolina to limitation
of liability provisions, the decisions in these states are not consistent with
decisions in South Carolina, nor are the decisions consistent among other
states.109 These inconsistencies highlight the difficulty of applying the common
law tests for unconscionability and public policy to determine the enforceability
of limitation of liability clauses.
For example, in Lucier v. Williams, 110 the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a limitation of liability provision in a home inspection contract was
unconscionable and violated New Jersey public policy. 11 Similar to Gladden v.
Boykin in South Carolina, the parties entered into a home inspection contract; the
defendants negligently performed the inspection; and the plaintiffs sued, alleging
breach of contract and negligence. 112 The home inspector moved for partial
summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs' remedy was capped by the
limitation of liability provision in the contract which stated that any liability of
the inspector was limited to one-half of the contract price.113 Unlike the South
Carolina court in Gladden, the Lucier court reasoned that the parties to the
contract had "grossly disparate" bargaining positions and the "underlying
purpose of the contract [was] worthless" because of the severely limited
liability. 114 Additionally, the court reasoned that the inspector had "no
meaningful incentive to act diligently in the performance of [the] home
inspection" because his only potential liability was the refund of half of the
inspector's fee.
Thus, the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Gladden v. Boykin and
the Superior Court of New Jersey's opinion in Lucier v. Williams demonstrate
the difficulty of uniformly applying the concepts of unconscionability and public

108. See id.
109. See, e.g., Lucier v. Williams, 841 A.2d 907, 912, 916 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
(holding a limitation of liability clause in a home inspection contract void as against public policy
and unconscionable); Schaffer v. Prop. Evaluations, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993), overruled by Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Exec. Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Mo.
2001) (en banc) (upholding a limitation of liability clause in a contract and overruling a previous
case in which the limitation of liability clause in a home inspection contract was stricken because
the parties did not adequately bargain for it).
110. 841 A.2d 907.
111. See Lucier, 841 A.2d at 912, 916.
112. See id. at 910; see also generally Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 739 S.E.2d 882
(2013) (similar facts).
113. See id.
114. Compare id. at 912, 913 (concluding that the parties had "grossly disparate" bargaining
positions), with Gladden, 402 S.C. at 145-46, 739 S.E.2d at 885 (concluding that the parties had
equal bargaining power).
115. Id. at 913.
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policy to limitation of liability clauses in consumer contracts for services.116
While South Carolina and New Jersey examine limitation of liability clauses
under the same test, the difference in outcomes highlights the difficulty in
applying the "amorphous concept" of unconscionability and the interests of
public policy to limitation of liability clauses in contracts."
IV.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSES

Determining the enforceability of limitation of liability provisions in
consumer services contracts requires a more consistent test. Fortunately, a more
consistent test exists in the liquidated damages test from the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts."' South Carolina has adopted the use of the Restatement
test in determining the enforceability of a challenged liquidated damages
clause.11 9 The liquidated damages test, if applied to limitation of liability
provisions, would give courts a more efficient tool to use in determining the
enforceability of the provision, while accomplishing the goals of the test for
unconscionability and avoiding conflicts with public policy interests. The
Restatement test would allow courts to determine enforceability with more
consistency.
Additionally, support for applying the liquidated damages test to limitation
of liability provisions appears in the 2003 proposed amendments to Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, which would have considered both unreasonably
large and small amounts of liquidated damages as unenforceable penaltiesunlike the current Restatement test, which considers only unreasonably large
damages a penalty.120 The test, as discussed below, balances factors by looking
at the parties' intent at the time of contracting and comparing the damages
agreed to with the actual damages suffered.121 If adopted with the appropriate
modifications, this test would provide courts and practitioners with a consistent
guide for determining the enforceability of a limitation of liability clause in a
consumer services contract.122
Although limitation of liability clauses and liquidated damages clauses are
utilized for different purposes in contracts, they are comparable. The essential
purpose for a limitation of liability clause is to cap liability at a certain agreedupon amount that any damages resulting from breach of the contract cannot

116. See id. at 916; Gladden, 402 S.C. at 146, 739 S.E.2d at 885.
117. Lucier, 841 A.2d at 911 (quoting Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 651 (N.J. 1971)).
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1), § 356, cmt. b (1981).
119. See Erie Ins. Co. v. Winter Constr. Co., 393 S.C. 455, 460, 713 S.E.2d 318, 321 (Ct. App.
2011) (citing Lewis v. Premium Inv. Corp., 351 S.C. 167, 172, 568 S.E.2d 361, 363 (2002)).
120. See LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, SALES AND LEASES: A PROBLEMSOLVING APPROACH app. at p. 11 (2009), available at http://www.ruschsales.com/forms/
appendix.pdf; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356.
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. b.
122. See infra Part IV.
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exceed.123 Similarly, liquidated damages clauses specify a certain amount to be
paid by the breaching party to the nonbreaching party in the event the contract is
breached.124 While one type of clause provides a limitation and the other a set
amount of damages, the motivations for utilizing these provisions in contracts
are mostly the same.
Both limitation of liability and liquidated damages clauses allow the parties
to the agreement to anticipate the possible loss if the contract is breached.125
This predictability allows for a reduction in the cost of the services provided
because the service provider can anticipate the maximum possible amount of
damages it could be forced to pay if it breaches any contracts with its
customers.126 If the service provider cannot cap liability or set it at a specific
amount, the cost of services provided would increase to compensate for the
potential unlimited liability in the service agreements entered into in its
business.127 The anticipation of possible losses allows businesses and consumers
to make more efficient decisions when entering into contractual agreements. 128
The Restatement's liquidated damages test is a balance of two factors: (1)
the actual or anticipated loss and (2) the difficulty of proof of loss.129 The
liquidated damages provision must be a reasonable approximation of the actual
loss that resulted from the particular breach or a genuine approximation of the
anticipated loss at the time of contract formation.13
The second factor concerns both the difficulty of proving the actual loss
suffered and the difficulty in approximating the anticipated loss at the time of
contract formation.131 The greater the difficulty in proving either the extent of
the actual loss that has occurred from the breach or establishing the anticipated
loss at the time of contract formation, the easier it is to show that the liquidated
damages provision is a reasonable estimation of the loss under the contract.132
In applying the test, courts must balance the two factors against each
other. 133 If either the actual loss or the anticipated loss at the time of contract
formation is difficult to prove, courts must afford considerable latitude to the
approximation of the liquidated damages. 134 By contrast, if the difficulty in
proving the loss under the second factor is slight, then courts must afford less

123. See Gwyn, supra note 8, at 61 (citing Fox & Wolff, supra note 8, at 408).
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356.
125. See Gwyn, supra note 8, at 61; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 356

cmt. b.

126. See Gwyn, supra note 8, at 61 (citing Fox & Wolff, supra note 8, at 408).
127. See id. This is beyond the scope of this Note, but it is inferable that-in addition to the
increased cost of such services-the cost of other services such as insurance would increase as well.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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latitude in the approximation of the loss and require more precision in the
liquidated damages provision.135
In other words, if the extent of the actual or anticipated loss under the
contract is uncertain and speculative, then the courts will defer to the judgment
of the parties at the time of contracting.136 If, however, the extent of actual or
anticipated loss is relatively easy to determine, then the courts will afford less
deference to the judgment of the parties at the time of contracting and compare
the liquidated damages to the actual loss suffered.137 The liquidated damages
provision is unenforceable as a penalty if the actual loss suffered is much less
than the amount of damages provided for in the liquidated damages provision.138
The provision is only unenforceable if it is a penalty if it causes the breaching
party to pay much more than the actual loss suffered by the nonbreaching
party. 139 The provision is enforceable if it is reasonable under the balancing test,
even if the provision provides for much less recovery than the actual losses
suffered. 140
South Carolina courts apply the test set out in the Restatement with some
inconsequential modifications.
Courts apply the Restatement test as follows:
"[W]hether the sum stipulated in the [contract] is a liquidated damage or an
unenforceable penalty is whether the amount is reasonably intended by the
parties as the predetermined measure of compensation for actual damages that
might be sustained by reason of nonperformance."l42 Courts consider factors
such as "[the contract's] subject matter, the ease or difficulty in measuring the
breach in damages and the magnitude of the stipulated sum, not only as
compared with the value of the subject of the contract, but in proportion to the
probable consequences of the breach."143
In Erie Insurance Co. v. Winter Construction Co.,
the South Carolina
Court of Appeals applied the Restatement test to uphold a liquidated damages
provision in a construction contract that provided for a percentage of the
outstanding contract amount to be paid in the event of breach. 45 Because of the
impossibility of determining the anticipated damages in the event of a breach and
the difficulty in proving the actual damages resulting from the breach, the court

135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Id. § 356(2), § 356 cmt. b.
139. See id.
140. Id. § 356 cmt. b.
141. See, e.g., Erie Ins. Co. v. Winter Const. Co., 393 S.C. 455, 462, 713 S.E.2d 318, 322 (Ct.
App. 2011) (noting that the touchstone question for distinguishing a liquidated damages clause from
an unenforceable penalty is a test based on the Restatement (quoting Tate v. Le Master, 231 S.C.
429, 441, 99 S.E.2d 39, 45-46 (1957))).
142. Id. (quoting Tate, at 441, 99 S.E.2d at 45-46) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. (quoting Foster v. Roach, 119 S.C. 102, 107, 111 S.E. 897, 899 (1922)).
144. 393 S.C. 455, 713 S.E.2d 318.
145. Id. at 458, 465, 713 S.E.2d at 319-20, 323.
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reasoned that the percentage formula used in the liquidated damages provision
was fair and reasonable. 146
Alternatively, a liquidated damages provision in a contract is unenforceable
if the court determines that the provision is actually a penalty, rather than a
genuine anticipation of damages.' 4 In ForeignAcademic & CulturalExchange
Services, Inc. v. Tripon,148 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
liquidated damages provision in a teacher's employment contract for a foreign
exchange teaching program was an unenforceable penalty.149 The liquidated
damages provision provided that the teacher was obligated to pay a sum not less
than $36,000 in the event of her breach, which would allegedly represent the
amount of the company's lost investment in the teacher. 1o The company sued,
arguing that the teacher's failure to return to her home country violated the terms
of the agreement and required her to pay the stipulated amount. 15 The court,
however, reasoned that the stipulated sum was an unenforceable penalty because
the stipulated amount was "plainly disproportionate to any probable damage[s]
resulting from respondent's failure to return home," and the lost investment
amount claimed by the company was a sunk cost on which the teacher's failure
to return home had no effect.152 The provided-for damages had no relationship
to the actual damages the company might sustain; thus, the provision was an
unenforceable penalty.153 The court balanced the actual damages suffered with
the prospective loss at the time of contracting and determined that, because the
actual damages suffered were so low compared to the provided-for damages, the
provision was an unenforceable penalty even if the damages were difficult to
approximate at the time of contract formation.154
The shortcoming of the liquidated damages test from the Restatement is that
a liquidated damages provision is unenforceable only if the sum stipulated is too
high compared to the actual damages suffered and is, thus, a penalty on the party
paying damages.155 This one-sided view of a penalty raises the question of what
happens when the liquidated damages provision is too low in comparison to the
actual damages suffered. The Restatement expressly provides that the liquidated
damages test does not contemplate provisions that fix damages in an
unreasonably small amount, but instead suggests that unreasonably small

146. See id. at 463, 713 S.E.2d at 322.
147. Foreign Academic & Cultural Exch. Servs., Inc. v. Tripon, 394 S.C. 197, 204, 715 S.E.2d
331, 334 (2011) (quoting Lewis v. Premium Inv. Corp., 351 S.C. 167, 172, 568 S.E.2d 361, 363
(2002)).
148. 394 S.C. 197, 715 S.E.2d 331.
149. Id. at 201, 204-05, 715 S.E.2d at 333, 334.
150. Id. at 201, 204, 715 S.E.2d at 333, 334.
151. Id. at 201, 715 S.E.2d at 333.
152. Id. at 204, 715 S.E.2d at 334.
153. Id. at 204-05, 715 S.E.2d at 334.
154. Id.
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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amounts ma5 be considered unconscionable under another section of the
Restatement.
However, fixing damages in an unreasonably small amount can be just as
penalizing as fixing damages in an unreasonably large amount. If damages are
provided in an unreasonably small amount compared to the actual loss, the
penalty is on the nonbreaching party, who is left without an adequate remedy
while the breaching party walks away from the failed agreement much better off.
A logical analysis would treat both unreasonably large and unreasonably small
liquidated damages as penalties and, thus, as unenforceable.
V. A NEW TEST FOR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY CLAUSES
Fixing the shortcoming in the liquidated damages test in the Restatement
provides a test to remedy the burdensome and inconsistent application of South
Carolina courts' current analysis of limitation of liability clauses. The test's
exclusion of liquidated damages provisions that set damages at an unreasonably
low amount demonstrates these provisions are not considered penalties.
Yet,
the Restatement provides that a liquidated damages provision that sets damages
in an unreasonably low amount "may be unenforceable as unconscionable."158
Thus, a liquidated damages provision that is unreasonably low could be
considered a penalty in one sense because of the potential limited recovery
available.159 A liquidated damages provision setting the amount of recovery in
an unreasonably low amount is comparable to a limitation of liability provision.
However, the liquidated damages section of the Restatement "does not purport to
cover the wide variety" of damage limiting provisions that exist in contracts.160
While the Restatement does not apply the liquidated damages section to
unreasonably low damages, 161 a court could logically apply the liquidated
damages test to limitation of liability clauses that unreasonably limit the remedy
available for breach of a contract. A limitation of liability provision that
unreasonably limits damages is essentially a liquidated damages provision that is
unreasonably low because both clauses provide for an unreasonably low amount
of recovery for contract breach.
Using a test comparable to the liquidated damages test to determine
enforceability of a limitation of liability provision would avoid the burdensome
considerations of public policy and unconscionability, while accomplishing the
same goals that these inquiries are meant to accomplish. The test would also
allow contracting parties to assess whether the clause reasonably estimates the
possible damages and, therefore, will be enforceable-rather than facing

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. § 356 cmt. d (referring to § 208).
See id.
Id. § 356 cmt. a (emphasis added).
See id. § 356 cmt. d.
Id.
See id.
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uncertainty over whether the clause will get thrown out on the grounds of public
policy, unconscionability, or both.162
Specifically, South Carolina courts should adopt a test that examines
whether the limitation of liability provision was a reasonable allocation of the
potential damages at the time of contracting. First, the courts should compare
the actual damages suffered as a result of the breach to the estimate of damages
in the limitation of liability provision. If at the time of contracting the damages
are relatively easy to estimate, the courts should require more precision in
estimating the limitation of damages. If, however, at the time of contracting the
potential damages are not capable of reasonable estimation, then courts should
require less precision in the limitation of liability compared to the actual harm
suffered. If the actual damages suffered are not capable of assessment, then the
focus should be on the intention of the parties at the time of contracting and
whether the limitation of liability was a reasonable estimation of the potential
damages under the agreement.
Applying the liquidated damages test to a limitation of liability clause
simplifies the inquiry into whether the clause is enforceable, while ensuring that
the clause is not unconscionable and does not conflict with public policy.163
Inherent in the concepts of unconscionability and public policy are the ideas of
fairness of the bargain and a reasonable remedy for breach of the agreement. 164
Looking to the intent of the parties at the time of contracting, as well as the
difficulty in estimating dama es, accomplishes the underlying goals of public
policy and unconscionability.
Parties cannot genuinely allocate the possible
loss if the remedy provided in the contract is grossly unfair to one party.166
Additionally, the test preserves the parties' interest in freedom of contract. If the
parties' intent at the time of contracting is to limit the remedy, the desires of the
parties will be upheld as reasonable under the circumstances because the parties
intended the limitation.
The relevant public policy interests are also preserved under this test.167
Comparing the limitation of liability to the actual damages suffered prevents
contracts from unfairly favoring service providers over consumers. A service
provider cannot insert a clause in a contract that leaves the consumer with only
nominal recovery because the service provider must make a reasonable
allocation of the risk when drafting the agreement. Thus, a service provider

162. The public policy and unconscionability considerations would still apply to limitation of
liability clauses, but the test would be used as a means to meet the goals of these policies without
the difficult analysis of the respective policies.
163. See generally Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 146, 739 S.E.2d 882, 885 (2013)
(upholding a limitation of liability provision because it was not unconscionable nor did it violate
public policy).
164. See id. at 147-54, 739 S.E.2d at 885-90 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
165. See supra notes 40-82 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
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cannot limit the consumer's remedy below an amount it knows is a reasonable
possible loss in the event of breach.
In the context of a home inspection contract, applying the liquidated
damages test to the limitation of liability clause would ensure that the
homeowner is not left without a remedy. 16 The liquidated damages test would
render the limitation of liability clause unenforceable if the remedy the consumer
is left with after the breach of contract is simply the return of the inspection fee.
At the time of contracting, the estimate of loss to either party resulting from a
breach of the contract would have to be made, and the return of the inspection
fee usually is not an adequate remedy. Even though the potential damages are
not capable of precise estimation, limiting the damages to the inspection fee is
unreasonably low. The actual damages that could result from a faulty inspection
could be grossly disproportionate when compared to the inspection fee itself. In
this situation, the limitation of liability clause should be stricken as
unenforceable. Striking limitation of liability clauses that cap the damages at a
return of the inspection fee gives service providers an incentive to arrive at a
reasonable estimate of prospective loss in the limitation of liability clause.
The proposed balancing test provides protection for consumers and
preserves the parties' interest in freedom of contract. The intention of the test is
to reach a middle ground between unreasonably limited remedies in contracts
due to overly restrictive limitation of liability clauses and allowing for
businesses to protect against unlimited liability in the interest of providing the
best service at the cheapest price. The test accomplishes these goals by focusing
on reasonableness under the circumstances of the contract and the intent of the
parties to the contract.169 While this test may not have a flawless application to
the competing interests of the consumer and the service provider, it allows for
the efficient determination of the enforceability of a limitation of liability clause
when adverse interests are involved in a breach of contract action.
VI. CONCLUSION

The tests for unconscionability and public policy considerations currently
employed by South Carolina courts to determine the enforceability of limitation
of liability clauses in consumer contracts for services are inconsistently applied
and favor service providers. 1 70 If South Carolina applied the balancing test from
the Restatement to limitation of liability clauses, the same goals of the current

168. But cf Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 145-46, 739 S.E.2d 882, 885 (2013) (upholding
a limitation of liability clause in a home inspection contract and awarding summary judgment to the
home inspector).
169. Cf supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement test for
determining the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses).
170. Compare Gladden, 402 S.C. at 146, 739 S.E.2d at 885, with Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle
Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 34, 644 S.E.2d 663, 674 (2007), and Gladden, 402 S.C. at 147, 739 S.E.2d
at 885 (Beatty, J., dissenting) (demonstrating the inconsistent application of the current tests).
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tests would be accomplished in a more consistent and efficient manner.
Additionally, consumers would be better protected from overly burdensome
limitations on liability by the reasonableness requirement of the liquidated
damages balancing test.
S. Harrison Williams
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